REVEALED: This System KILLS in 39 Seconds and Nothing is Being DONE!

0:00 a new and to Pilot's previously unknown system causing severe safety issues when activated sounds familiar well the problem is that we are not talking about MC here instead a new system which has already activated at least twice with some very scary results everything in a departure from my normal way of working I'm now making this video to highlight this danger before something really bad happens and hopefully to get your help to get the regulators to intervene I also want to highlight that while none of the information that I'm about to explain in this video is disputed the regulator currently disagrees with my conclusion and I will leave it up to you to decide who is right or wrong here stay

0:49 tuned when I worked on my videos about the horrible boing 737 Max accidents a few months back I was struck by just how sad it was but the issue with mcast was wasn't properly understood by the pilots and Regulators already after the first crash if that had been the case then maybe the second accident could have been avoided so I decided that if I ever came across something similar I would use my social media reach to try and inform the pilot Community as soon as I possibly could but at the same time I thought that this would obviously never happen again because you know my industry learned from the hard lessons that it's been taught so all systems must surely be well understood evaluated and explained by now

1:35 right well I will let you be the judge of that now I will tell this story in the context of two separate incidents which happened back in 2023 but since this video is done in a preemptive effort rather than learning from something horrible that has already happened I have access to very limited information about the first incident and only the preliminary report from the second but it is really important to point out that what happened on these flights is already outlined in the ntsb's interim report as well as in some leaked information from the FAA and we have not found anything that disputes how the related systems performed nor the effects that they had so the only thing that's really in question here is how the FAA and in continuation asasa

2:23 has decided to react on it on March the 5th 2023 an almost brand new boing 737 max-8 from Southwest Airlines was getting ready to operate a flight from Havana Cuba over to Fort Lauderdale in Florida a completely normal flight from what we can tell I'm saying that because as I mentioned we don't have a full report on it yet but what we do know is that there were 147 passengers on board as well as two pilots and four cabin crew the two pilots eventually lined up as normal on Runway C6 and around 16:30 in the afternoon noon they started accelerating down the runway we don't know which of the two pilots were pilotflying but it won't really matter for this story anyway but what we do know is that the

3:10 initial part of the takeoff proceeded normally with the gear being retracted off the rotation and the aircraft continuing along its clear departure route but as it was climbing through approximately 800 ft it suddenly ingested a huge turkey vulture into its right hand engine and also hit another one straight over the aircraft nose now bird strikes are a part of life for an airline pilot during the busiest migratory months I normally experienced a bird strike in some form almost every week but it's pretty rare that we hit birds of that size and that they are ingested into the engines the size of the bird was later estimated as 1.2 to 2 kilos or 3 to 4 lb which was around the 4B certification requirements of the CFM leap on Bravo

3:56 engines fitted to the 727 Max in any case this bird caused some immediate severe damage to the fan of the number two engine actually breaking off a whole fan blade and also damaging several others but the engine did what it was supposed to do and contained the shards of those blades inside of the enclosure and it also initially continued to run which caused unbalance in the fan and therefore some severe vibrations remember that the pilots immediately realized that they had suffered some type of damage to their engine they therefore went through the fault isolation process identified the number two engine as the faulty one and executed the memory items for engine fire severe damage and separation in order to secure it and

4:43 according to our initial information the right-and engine fire warning also activated at this time because of all of this the pilots quickly also called in a May Day to the Cuba controllers explaining the situation and asking if they could get vectors back for a potential emergency landing again the details are quite scarce at the moment but as the pilots were dealing with this thick acrid white smoke was quickly entering the passenger cabin from the air conditioning Vents and risers pictures from the flight shows a visibility of only a few seat rows in the cabin and this smoke soon also entered a cockpit all by in a much less dense capacity now again getting bad odors into the cabin after a bird strike to the engine is not very uncommon it

5:28 generally smells like your cooking a chicken for several minutes if a bird has been ingested into the core of the engine but this was very different this smoke was white and like I mentioned acurate in smell and it quickly started irritating the throats and eyes of the passengers and crew on board now the pilots quickly ran through their Associated checklist and when they were done they executed a successful single engine approach into Runway 06 the same Runway as they had just taken off from Once the aircraft came to a stop stop on the taxiway just off the Runway the two pilots decided to immediately Evacuate the aircraft as the cabin was at that point still full of smoke luckily no one was seriously hurt in this incident even though some passengers required some later medical attention due to

6:15 respiratory issues now news of this incident soon reached both the FAA and the ntsp and an Annex 13 investigation was opened into it but maybe it wasn't heavily prioritized amongst the hundreds of other bird strike reports that pour in every day I don't know what we do know is that not much happened initially but it would soon turn out that this was far from just a normal bird strike now before I get to that I want to make it perfectly clear here that we wouldn't be able to create these kind of digging investigative videos if it wasn't for the brave support from our sponsors and today that's incog a great service that helps you protect your personal data from being sold online you see the reason you keep getting more and more

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7:48 it was being sold by over 100 different Brokers but incog are now chasing all of them and it's gotten significantly better since I signed up so if you are ready to start taking control of your digital privacy then use my link here below which is incog docomo and use the discount code pilot that will give you a whopping 60% discount on the annual plan thank you incog now let's see what actually happened to that investigation fast forward to the 20th of December 20123 about 9 months after the first event on this day another Southwest Airlines crew was getting ready to operate flight 554 from New Orleans International Airport over to

8:34 Tampa in Florida again the aircraft used was a fairly new boing 737 Max 8 and as it turns out the fact that it was a Max is going to be important here but I want to emphasize here that the max is not the only aircraft affected by what I'm about to tell you in any case the preparation for this flight proceeded in a normal fashion with the weather along the Route expected to be good at the airport there was only some light winds from a northeasterly direction few clouds and a temperature of 16° c a great day for flying in other words since we only have access to the preliminary report we don't know the experience level of the pilots and crew on this flight but we do know that there were 133 passengers and six crew on board and that the captain was going to

9:20 operate this pilot flying on this particular leg so once everyone was on board and the pre-flight was complete the two pilots finished up their before star checklist and soon requested push and start by the New Orleans ground controller after having started their engines which on the max takes a lot of time Southwest Airlines flight 554 soon started taxing out toward R 11 for departure the before takeoff checklist and Associated procedures were completed according to standard operating procedures and at time 1414 the aircraft received its takeoff clearance and the captain moved the trust levers forward this accelerated the two giant leap one Bravo and first to 40% to stabilize them equally and then once he pressed toga into 83% which was the calculat take of

10:07 trust setting now before we continue much further here I want to talk a little bit more about these engines because they will hold a very critical place in this story as most of you know the Boeing 737 Max is vastly more fuel efficient than its predecessor the 737 n now some of those most gains comes from aerodynamical improvements in the form of better winglets and a more round Apu exhaust but the vast majority comes from the Fantastic CFM leap 1 Bravo engines in my videos about the max accidents I highlighted the kind of engineering Hoops that Boeing had to go through in order to fit those substantially larger engines under the wing of the 737 but even though I touched on it one

10:54 thing that I didn't go into much detail about was the fan of those engines you see the jet engine as a principle hasn't changed much over the last few decades but what has become abundantly clear is that a larger fan in the front of the engine can move a bigger volume of air backwards than a smaller fan can and since it's more economic to move a larger volume of air backward slower than to accelerate a smaller volume more to achieve the same thrust a bigger fan is obviously better but it's not only the diameter of the fan which is important for this it's also the size and number of fan blades if you look at a cfm56 from the older NG and a Le onean Bravo from the front you will notice that the leap has fewer but wider fan

11:41 blades which adds to the overall efficiency gain but this also brings a problem bigger individual fan blades means a bigger potential imbalance if one blade should fail for whatever reason and that rotary imbalance could then cause huge loads on the shaft bearings supports and even the fan frame and the pylon who holds the engine in place in other words these vibrations if left unchecked could cause some further serious damage now there were a few ways of mitigating this problem one would be to just strengthen the affected components by basically beefing them up but that would add a lot of unwanted weight to the engine which would reduce its overall efficiency the other solution was to

12:27 create a new system that could activate in case of an imbalance and somehow reduce the overall vibrations caused so how could that be done then well if the fan rotor was centered in position using structurally weakened components then if heavy enough vibrations were encountered those components could break and allow the fan rotor to move in a bigger Circle and find a new center and that would reduce the immediate loads transmitted to the rest of the structure this was a very smart solution which enabled big weight savings and it was named the load reduction device or the lrd now the lrd was designed to be operating completely independently of

13:13 any pilot input basically just helping the pilots out in case of a severe damage so it was therefore not described in any pilot manual but it turns out that there was one feature of this lrd that was initially very poor poorly understood and of which knowledge would have been very appreciated by us pilots who actually fly the max you see the activation of the lrd also meant that the oil a sump would open up through the creation of a gap between the flange of the AF 1 and two bearing support and the fan frame translation in case the lrd activated most of the engine oil would be almost instantaneously released into the airflow of the engine and therefore into the core up stream of the engine

14:00 compressor stages now that might not sound so bad I mean the engine would have already failed so it wouldn't need its oil anyway but this is where we come to the next technical detail the air conditioning system now before I continue I just want to point out here that this lrd system is not unique to the 77 Max leap 1 Bravo engine it is also used in the leap 1 Alpha fitted to most Airbus A320 NEOS as well as the engines power in the Boeing trip 7 and the 787 and possibly other modern engines as well but at least in the case of the 787 it would not come with the same effects that I'm about to describe and I'm not fully clear on the effects it will have in the Airbus or the bo Tri 7 either since these events both happen

14:45 on the 737 Max and in the max the design of the air conditioning system would make this feature very relevant as we will soon see let's go back to the Southwest jet which was now accelerating down the runway in New Orleans the takeoff was initially completely uneventful and after rotation the captain asked for the first officer to raise the gear and everything then continued completely normally until at an altitude of around 800 ft where the captain called out bird as he saw something black swish by his left hand window within moments the pilots could then hear a thump followed by severe vibrations a complete loss of trust from the number one engine as well as a firebell masterer warning fire and

15:31 illumination of the fire handle on the left side the captain instinctively pushed right R to counteract the yo and then called for the engine fire severe damage or separation checklist from the quick reference card but as soon as the first officer started executing these items intense accurate white smoke quickly started filling the cockpit he later reported that within seconds he could barely see the captain in the left hand seat so he immediately called out masks after a few seconds both Pilots then pull out their masks from their storage boxes and quickly Dawn them now the crew oxygen masks in the cockpit are designed so that they can be dawned using only one hand to do that we grab the red handle and pull the mask out of

16:18 the box squeezing the handle which inflates the back of the Mask so it expands and makes it easy to fit it over our head when the handle is then released the mask will contract and seal tight over our face and after that we can then choose the settings as either normal which mixes outside air and oxygen 100% which gives 100% oxygen on demand or emergency which gives 100% oxygen under positive pressure something that's good if smoke or fumes is present these masks are good at what they are designed to do but even though they can be fitted with only one hand the reality is that the pilots would have had to First remove their headset then get the mask on and then finally put their

17:04 headsets back on while it's potentially also depending on the mask type having to change the audio control to mask in order to be able to communicate and this especially getting the headset back on is something that typically requires two hands to do properly and if you have things like glasses it can be further complicated remember that because it will become important later in any case the these two pilots had soon dawned their masks and established communication so the first officer could now continue to execute the checklist but here came the next problem you see the smoke was now so thick that the captain could barely make out his colleague in the right seat nor his instruments on the screens in front of him so he soon found himself looking

17:49 at his head up display since that was the only thing that he could see clearly and head up displays are not fitted as standard on the max nor is it available a in the right hand seat in most cases even when it's fitted so what was going on here well it turns out that the aircraft had hit a huge female bold Eagle which had once again severely damaged the fan blades this time to the left-hand engine this had then caused the severe vibrations that the pilots had felt and it had also for the second time in 9 months activated the lrd which then reduced the vibrations but it had also started dumping oil straight into the engine core and here is where the air conditioning and pressurization system

18:35 comes in you see in order for the passengers and crew to be able to breed normally without the use of oxygen masks when we're flying at high altitudes we need to artificially increase the pressure inside of the cabin the way we traditionally do this is by the help of something known as bleed a which comes from the engines it's called bleed a because we effectively bleed need some pressure away from the compressor part of the engine and this bleeder is then used for several things including engine and Wing deicing pressurization of water tanks and hydraulic reservoirs but mainly as I said for the air conditioning and pressurization that is achieved through two Contraptions known as air conditioning packs who also cools down the air removes some of the water content and controls the temperature now

19:23 I know it might sound a little bit strange that we are taking air from inside of the engines to breede but remember that under normal circumstances this air is siphoned away before the combustion Chambers meaning that the air is completely clean now this bleed a system also actually steals a little bit of thrust from the engines meaning that it's not super efficient which is why the boing 787 uses electrical compressors for this instead but overall it's a very common and handy solution which most aircraft still use on the boing 737 all the way from the classic generation through the NG and now on the max this pressurization system has been divided into two different sides bleed a from the right engine is used to provide air for the passenger cabin and to a smaller extent also the cockpit and the

20:10 left engine provides bleed primarily to the cockpit obviously the left engine provides far more bleed there than the cockpit needs so some of it is also going into something known as the mix manifold and then gets distributed into the cabin as well but the ventilation rate is significantly higher in the cockpit than the rest of the cabin now this system does include various check valves constructed to trip off the system if an over pressure or an over temperature condition is sensed and one of those sensors is called the pressure regulating shut off valve or psov which is triggered to close if the RPM of the core also known as the N2 drops below 62% and that would then stop all bleed there coming from that affected engine

20:56 now having heard all of this can you maybe start to see the problem in this scenario after the bird strike had activated the load relief device it now dumped around 14 quarts or 13 L of engine oil straight into the compressor once it was in there it was then heated up by the compression and basically carburated into a fine aerosol which was then pulled into the air conditioning system at the fourth and the 10th stage of the compressor those oil particles were then pushed through the air conditioning pack and then straight into the cockpit where it appeared as a thick white acrid smoke toxology analyzis of the smoke later showed that it contained high levels of formalde and acryline so high

21:44 in fact that they could in this scenario reach potentially lethal levels within 39 seconds so that was now what had happened on board flight 554 since the Eagle had hit the left engine it was now the cockpit bit that was being filled with smoke was in the earlier Cuba event it had been the right engine where the smoke had primarily entered into the passenger cabin in that case the toxology analysis showed that because of the much greater volume in the passenger cabin the concentration of toxins was not able to reach lethal levels but could still be very uncomfortable and of course form a risk for people with pre-existing conditions now I also want to mention here that dropping the passenger oxygen masks would not help in this scenario since they are not sealed and works by mixing generated oxygen

22:31 with the surrounding air so the smoke would be inhaled anyway I'm saying this because in the Cuba event passengers allegedly Pride the oxygen mask panels open in order to get the oxygen masks out which like I explained would not have helped anyway the pilots of flight 554 had now Dawn their oxygen mask which meant that they could at least breed safely but the visibility was still a big concern the first officer kept reading through the check list where he soon reached the fire handle related engine confirm pull step and once that handle was pulled the smoke started to dissipate and the visibility improved as the air was now supplied by the healthy right engine instead now the left engine had actually failed properly here which meant that the core RPM had dropped below 62%

23:19 within approximately 16 seconds after the eagle had hit and that had already closed the pr sov so at the time that the first officer pulled the fire handle almost 2 and 1 half minutes had passed which meant that the smoke had likely already started to improve before the handle was pulled but this also meant that the smoke would have potentially become even worse if the engine had continued to run like in the Kuba event now once the reference items were complete and the pilots felt that they had the situation more under control they declared an emergency to air traffic control ATC recordings also showed that they asked the controllers to get everything they had in terms of rescue Vehicles out to help them as they prepared for the landing the captain then made a PA to the passengers advising them about the fact that they

24:05 were returning to the airport and that they would see fire trucks off the landing and this is something that is always a good thing to do as that site might otherwise cause nervous Flyers quite some extra concern overall based on the limited information that we have in this report it looks like the pilots and cabin crew did a great job under these circumstances the pilots eventually finished up their check brief the approach and then flew a successful single engine visual approach back into New Orleans without any further issues now flying a visual approach with masks on is not as easy as it sounds because the mask severely limits the peripheral vision but it's also a quicker way to get down on the ground so I completely understand why they did that after landing the cockit

24:52 environment had cleared enough for the crew to taxi into the stand and disembark normally which is a very positive outcome from this event in other words but I would personally be very interested in hearing if those first seconds of inhaling this dangerous smoke has had any long-term health effects for the pilots hopefully we will learn more about that in the ntsp final report and I really hope that they're okay but now we get to where this Saga takes a very strange and in my mind potentially dangerous turn because initially nothing really happened but around 10 months later the FAA appears to have also opened up an investigation into this by that time

25:38 Boeing had already issued a bulletin explaining the lrd system to the pilots and telling them that any engine failure with smoke should be treated like a severe damage the bulletin also said that the memory items should be done methodically but rapidly in this case including Dawning The Mask as appropriate it also explained the most appropriate checklist sequence to use in this case as well as a few more things but it didn't change any procedures instead it mainly reinforced what we Pilots were already trained to do now the FAA seemed to initially also have been on the ball and an investigation team was dispatched to look into these incidents further and they soon realized that this lrd system which was already certified and like I mentioned presence on several different aircraft types had

26:25 this very unfortunate side effect of dumping engan oil straight into the compressor now the investigators were obviously concerned when they realized the effect that this could have especially on the max where an activation on the left hand side could fill the cockpit with toxic smoke in just a few seconds so in October of 2024 10 months after the last known event according to articles in the Seattle Times the investigators produced an internal document where they described the problem and the catastrophic effects it could potentially have they also outlined six different recommendations on how to deal with this issue and those recommendations reads as follows one due to the potential catastrophic risk associated with anr deactivation on the number one engine

27:11 which can quickly expose the flight deck to high concentrations of potentially lethal Aeros lized chemicals at critical phase of flight we propose the following mitigation strategy to be required by emergency air wordness directive until such a Time as a permanent fix is implemented firstly all boing 727 Max aircraft shall perform takeoffs with pack one off if Pack 2 is available Pack 2 can adequately pressurize the aircraft and maintain temperature levels in the cabin now if pack 2 is not available then the Apu bleed can supply air conditioned air and pressurization if both Pack 2 and the Apu bleeder is unavailable well then the aircraft is not authorized for flight

27:58 if this procedure is used pack one can then be selected on after reaching the acceleration altitude or 3,000 ft above ground whichever is higher alternatively the most conservative approach is to contuct all takeoffs in the Boeing 727 Max with both packs off and with the Apu bleed supplying conditioned air and pressurization so this was the very first point and what all of this essentially meant was that the aircraft should be prepared for a potential bird strike or equivalent by making sure that if that happened and the L R de activated the smoke could not fill the cockpit and make an already bad situation many magnitudes worse now sure this recommendation would create a bit of hassle for Max Pilots out there but I can personally guarantee that we Pilots prefer that to the risk of experiencing

28:45 the scenario I just told you the second recommendation said that at a time interval acceptable to the administrator they should require a design change which could detect the immediate impulse of a bird strike or fan blade out event and automatically close the affected Indian PR sov or trip the associated pack that new design should not only rely on N2 core speed reduction but rather the immediate impulse to ensure that the pr sov is closed as quickly as possible now from the information that I have been able to gather this fix could be done by a software change so likely it wouldn't even require any hardware update the third Point highlighted the need for a review of all new design features on the boing 77 Max and make

29:32 sure that they are all adequately shown and explained in the Pilot's manuals because yet again there was now a system on board in this case the lrd whose existence activation and crucially whose operational effect was not explained to the pilots in their manuals similar to what had happened in the case of mcass the fourth recommendation just highlighted the fact that Boeing's initial bulletin was incorrectly written since it indicated that they were still looking into why the oil spill happened when their own presentation clearly explained that this was an expected outcome of the lrd activation not the smoke in the cockpit but the oil spill the fifth recommendation said that all oxygen masks in the cockpit should be changed to the single goggle and mask design and that's because around 15% of

30:19 the world's Max Fleet is still using a mask that requires separate goggles which in this case would mean longer eye exposure to the IR ating and toxic smoke and finally the sixth recommendation required Boeing to reassess the likelihood of an RD activation as they had stated during certification that they expected maximum one event every year but those two events had happened 9 month apart which might be a fluke but might also not be now all of these recommendations were from a pilot's perspective very reasonable and to the point if there is one thing that we all should have learned from the 7 7 max accidents is that it's better to prevent the risk from happening than to assume that Pilots will react in a certain way

31:05 and just inform them through a bulletin so what do you guys think that the FAA did here well whatever it was it certainly didn't add any actions to remedy this situation in fact the only reason that we know about these investigators recommendations is because their internal memo was leaked to the press and then published by Bloomberg and the Seattle Times among others after receiving the information from its investigators the FAA apparently convened a corrective action review board carb and in that review they decided that no recommendations or emergency Airness directive was needed at that time unconfirmed reports also indicate that the lead investigator who had issued those recommendations was

31:51 also suddenly removed from those investigations now the national Transportation safety board and TSB are now working on their own investigation into these incidents which again is what I'm basing most of this story on and they might come with their own recommendations eventually which I certainly hope that they do but that just doesn't help the fact that there seem to be something very problematic going on here I have reached out to the FAA asking for their version of the story and how their carb came to the conclusion that this didn't constitute a big enough risk to act on and I just received this response back plus a promise of a call which never materialized so here comes the statement the FAA held a corrective action review board carb on November 26 2024 to

32:39 discuss the CFM leap 1 Bravo engine bird strikes leading to smoke entering boing 727 Max aircraft the carb work included evaluating several internal FAA safety recommendations and based on the available data the carb determined the issue does not warrant immediate action and the FAA will follow it its standard rul making process to address it the FAA issued a continued airw as notification to the International Community Canik about new information Boeing provided to operators of aircraft with leap one Bravo engines the new information contains enhanced instructions that direct fly crew more quickly to the appropriate actions when they experience abnormal engine indications background the FAA continues

33:24 to assess of these events could affect engines with similar structural designs as you can see this didn't really answer anything and I followed up with more questions but have not received any answer I've also talked with a representative of the engine manufacturer who was extremely helpful and explained that the lrd had the function as designed in this case and that they were very pleased that the NTSB had now confirmed in their interim report that they are working with boing to find a solution he also wanted me to include their statement about these incidents and it go like this we support the ntsb's investigation and we continue to work closely with Boeing and the authorities on learning from this event now iasa the European safety agency apparently took part in

34:11 the faa's carb and also agreed with their conclusion which makes this whole thing even more bewildering to me now for those of you who aren't yet horrified about this and maybe even agree with the F's assessment that there's nothing urgent to see here let me take you into an alternate sequence of events one that will hopefully make you and the FAA understand why I am making this video so let's start by looking at a completely madeup flight with butter Airlines the airline that my friend Ben and I are using when we teach our virtual boing 737 courses here it comes it's evening in salsburg Austria when our fictional crew is taxing out for takeoff on Runway 16 the captain is p of flying and all the procedures have

34:57 been completed except for the before takeup checklist below the line the crew has spent a lot of time briefing the departure because just ahead of them to the right is a huge mountain on the foothills of the Alps and high terrain is also present on their left side where a beautiful castle is perched on top of a big hill because of these obstacles there are special procedures outlined in the briefing for Saltsburg and in case of an engine failure of the takeoff the crew needs to remember to delay the normal acceleration and flap retraction and they also need to make a slight right turn before turning more than 180° left in order to keep the turning radius tight enough to avoid the mountains around them now the captain is confident he has flown here many times before and

35:43 knows the procedures by heart anyone flying to this airport also needs to do special simulator training where these procedures are practice and endian failures well they almost never happen anyway his colleague however is not quite as con confident he has only flown around 1,000 hours in total and this is the first time that he seen salsburg for real after the special simulator training and that's also why they have chosen the captain's Pilot Flying for this leg as the Darkness Falls the boing 737 Max 8 lines up on the runway completes the last part of the checklist and soon receives its take of clearance the special procedures also calls for full engine trust so this should be a fun takeoff but what the pilots don't realize is that it's migratory season

36:29 for the Canada geese and a large flock is right now getting ready to land on the grassy field just next to the runway about 2/3 down the captain moves the trust levels up to 40% and the first office then calls stabilized toga is then pushed and the two leap on Bravo engines Roar into life quickly accelerating the aircraft on the runway the first officer call 80 kns to which the captain responds checked and the next call is an automatic V1 call from the aircraft indicating that they're now committed to the takeoff but just as that happens two of the last Canada Gees swoops down in front of the aircraft and get sucked into the left engine this immediately Breaks Loose one of the fan blades causing severe vibrations and the activation of the

37:15 lrd the engine stops delivering trust which means that the captain now pushes right R it to stay on the runway as the first officer calls out rotate the rotation is slightly slower than normal around 2 to 2 and A2 de per second due to the failure and just as the captain is doing this thick white smoke starts pouring into the cockpit the captain now has a choice to make continue concentrating on the rotation and the initial maneuvering of his aircraft or immediately reach for his oxygen mask and he chooses to continue flying his colleague the first officer is able to get his oxygen mask on but this also now means that a communication barrier is raised between the two pilots as establishing communication with only one wearing a mask is a little bit difficult the rotation takes about 7

38:02 Seconds to complete but after the aircraft is Airborne the engine failure means that there's still a lot of precise handling required to make sure that the control is maintained and we train Pilots to not do anything below 400 ft except to raise the gear with a positive rate of climb and cancel any warnings after 400 ft the pilot flying should ask the pilot monitoring to State the malfunction but the problem is that it takes about 30 seconds to reach 400 ft with this type of failure and the reason we don't want to rush things is because it's really easy to make mistakes in situations like this and shutting down the wrong engine would be truly catastrophic now the obvious thing might be for the first officer to take controls as soon as possible here since he has the oxygen mask on but taking

38:49 over controls during an engine failure at low altitude is not as easy as it might sound and remember that depending on the smoke concentration he might not even see his instruments properly so the captain continues to concentrate on his flying at least initially all while coughing with his eyes burning and it's also now getting harder and harder for him to see his instruments through his tears and the smoke now do you remember how long it theoretically took for the levels of form mahide and acryline to reach deadly levels in these events yeah only around 39 seconds according to that leaked document so as this aircraft reaches for 00 ft 37 seconds has already passed and the captain starts slumping down in his seat the first officer calls out for him

39:36 but he doesn't get any answer back so the first officer now takes control as per standard operating procedures but he is struggling to see the instrument since he doesn't have a head up display and in front of the aircraft the mountains are now looming the first officer is alone the engine has failed the cockpit is full of smoke and he now has to fly a very complicated maneuver by himself whilst also doing the memory items for Eng in severe damage in order to stop the smoke from continuing to fill the cockpit this does not look good now if you guys think that I'm overdoing this I am not to my knowledge no Airline out there is training their pilots in how to deal with a combined severe Indian failure and a smoke event at the same

40:21 time and certainly not with a pilot in capacitation added on top of that and all of those things have been shown as possibilities if this was to happen in the wrong time at the wrong place and it's also worth remembering here that these activations have already happened twice would the captain be able to get his mask on in the example that I just showed you maybe but again my money would be on him just concentrating on flying during the rotation and early climb and in any case maybe just isn't good enough here so knowing all of this if you were sitting in the back of this aircraft climbing out of Saltsburg would you have preferred if these Pilots had just been told to turn off the left pack to avoid this whole scenario yeah the engine would still

41:07 have failed but now it would have been an engine failure like any other something that the crew would have been well trained for the reason I'm asking this is because from where I am sitting it looks like the FAA and possibly also yasa has taken the opposite stance and choosing to Simply do nothing while waiting for the NTS be recommendations and getting to that final report can still take months or even a year I normally never make videos like this but I've also never come across anything like this before I have really really tried to find a weak spot in my logic and to find a valid reason for the faa's decision to not issue a temporary air Burness directive but the more I look into this The Stranger it becomes

41:55 and it also reminds me more and more more of that Gentleman's Agreement back in the' 70s which led to the fatal accident of Turkish Airlines flight 981 and of course the recent mcast debacle I also want to be very clear here I don't really blame boing or CFM at this point the engine was certified with this system and it's unlikely that Boeing knew that the activation would have this effect and Boeing also quickly issued a bulletin explaining it and giving guidance to its Pilots about how to deal with it so it's ultimately the fa A's job to make sure that actions are being taken to eradicate serious threats safety through bulletin just doesn't seem to be very effective when it comes to systems like this we are also awaiting information about the other aircraft that have this

42:42 system installed no one that I've talked to can say if the Airbus a treatment in Neo would be affected in a similar way or if it already has some sort of software Safeguard in place and that also goes for the boing Triple 7 in anyway no matter how I look at this I cannot up with a single good reason for the FAA to have disregarded their own investigators recommendations so if you are an American out there I would suggest that you contact your Congressman or woman and ask them to get to the bottom of this I want nothing more than the safest possible outcome for my colleagues and right now it doesn't feel like that is being dealt with like I mentioned I have reached out to CFM the FAA boing and the Assa comments about this and I'm still awaiting answers from boing and the Assa if if I get something I will probably

43:28 put that out into the community tab here the information in this video is based on the ntsb's interim report a leaked FAA internal document dated the 28th of October as well as cfm's presentation about the lrd and several articles to which I have linked to here in the description below the opinions that I have laid forward are my own but I know that they are also widely shared by several of my colleagues as well and I also know that many of them didn't fully understand the width of the problem when they read boing's bulletin about the LD so hopefully this will help now I hope that you have found this video interesting please watch these videos next and consider joining my patreon crew if you want to support this kind of work my name is pet hornfeld and you're

44:15 watching Mentor pilot have an absolutely fantastic day and I'll see you next time bye-bye